Visiting the US for the third time: Why has Mr. To Lam not been formally invited by the White House?
From September 20-25, General Secretary and President To Lam will attend the high-level discussion session of the 81st United Nations General Assembly, bilateral activities in the US, and a state visit to Canada at the invitation of Canadian Governor General Louise Arbour.
According to the announcement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, during his stay in the US, Mr. To Lam will deliver a speech at the high-level discussion session of the United Nations General Assembly and have bilateral meetings and exchanges with leaders of several countries and international organizations.
During this time, Mr. To Lam's schedule did not include any meetings with US President Donald Trump.
A White House official said on September 15th that they have not yet determined Mr. Trump's itinerary during the Vietnamese leader's visit to the US.
Meanwhile, political observer Vu Duc Khanh noted that Mr. To Lam's trip to the US in the coming days will be overshadowed by Mr. Donald Trump's meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
This is the third time Mr. To Lam has visited the US since he became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam in August 2024.
The first time was in September 2024, when he visited New York to attend the 79th United Nations General Assembly as General Secretary and President.
The most recent time was in February 2026, when the Vietnamese leader visited the US to attend the first session of the Gaza Peace Council. During this trip, Mr. To Lam had a meeting with Mr. Trump at the White House, but it was not an official visit.
In this third time, there is no information suggesting that Mr. Trump will meet Mr. To Lam, whether informally or at the White House.
Why has Mr. To Lam not made an official visit to the US?
Previously, Mr. To Lam and Mr. Trump had exchanged invitations to visit each other via telephone.
Hanoi had also prepared for Mr. To Lam's visit to the US once the bilateral trade agreement between the two countries was completed, according to Reuters and Bloomberg.
However, to date, no official or state visit has taken place.
Explaining to BBC News Vietnam, Professor Alexander Vuving from the Asia-Pacific security research center Daniel K. Inouye of the US Department of Defense stated that the US may not have arranged time for such a visit.
In November, the US will enter an midterm election, where all 435 House seats and about a third of Senate seats will be re-elected; economic issues, cost of living, immigration, and international conflicts are becoming prominent topics.
Another reason, according to Professor Vuving, is that the US and Vietnam "have many issues to discuss".
"If an official visit were to take place, there would have to be negotiations and reach some agreement. Part of it is because the issues between the two countries have not been resolved, right?" asked Professor Vuving.
In April 2025, the US initially announced a 46% reciprocal tariff on Vietnam.
Then, during the 90-day period, Mr. Trump "postponed" a 10% tariff on the 100 million population Southeast Asian country.
At the end of this period, Hanoi was subjected to a 20% tariff on "made in Vietnam" goods, and a 40% tariff on goods transshipped through Vietnam from third countries, effective from August 7, 2025.
However, after the US Supreme Court overturned this reciprocal tariff, in late July 2026, President Trump imposed new tax policies on 60 economies, including Vietnam with a rate of 12.5%, among the highest taxed countries.
To date, Hanoi and Washington have completed six rounds of negotiations on a bilateral reciprocal trade agreement, but no specific agreement has been reached yet.
Furthermore, Professor Vuving also mentioned a third reason: Vietnam is preparing to host many activities of the APEC High-Level Week 2027 in Phu Quoc, scheduled for November 2026. The list of invitees includes leaders such as US President Donald Trump.
This observer suggests that when Mr. Trump attends APEC, it may be an opportunity for the leaders of both sides to meet, making an official visit by Vietnamese leaders to the US no longer too necessary.
The World's Highest Trade Surplus
Before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam officially confirmed Mr. To Lam's US trip, Reuters reported that an internal draft plan listed 29 agreements that could be announced on September 23 in New York at a business conference attended by Vietnamese leaders.
These trade agreements - largely considered non-legally binding - were part of Vietnam's strategy over the past few months to appease Washington, in the context of the Trump administration threatening new tariffs on a country heavily reliant on exports.
Reuters' source also stated that Mr. To Lam's trip was also aimed at promoting the progress of trade negotiations with the US and could lead to a trade agreement that had been negotiated over the past year.
The visit took place against the backdrop of Vietnam having the world's largest trade surplus with the US.
In the first half of 2026, Vietnam surpassed China, Mexico, and Taiwan, becoming the partner with the largest goods trade surplus with the US, at about $114 billion, according to Washington data.
Analysts suggest that the trade deficit of Washington with Hanoi has increased not only due to goods transshipped from China but also reflects another wave as a number of major manufacturers shift production to Vietnam.
According to Professor Vuving, the trade deficit "is clearly a major obstacle to the relationship between the US and Vietnam".
"The US government is very unhappy to have a country with a large trade surplus with them. I think some of Mr. Trump's advisors may think this is an expression of what they think - that Vietnam has become a hub for shipping Chinese goods to the US. From that perspective, they will pressure the Vietnamese side to deal with this issue more thoroughly, which will lead to very strong pressure on Vietnam to actually reduce those trade surpluses," Professor Vuving analyzed.
The expert noted that since most of the agreements expected during this visit are not legally binding, and in the event they are signed, it will also take time to take effect, it is not possible to immediately resolve Washington's concerns about the imbalance in bilateral trade.
Vietnam's Steps
From March to May 2026, the US initiated three major trade investigations against Vietnam, under Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974, regarding issues of excess production capacity, forced labor, and intellectual property violations.
US officials focused on supply chain issues, goods transshipped from China, as well as software copyrights, counterfeit goods, and imitation goods...
The Vietnamese government has also carried out a series of crackdowns on counterfeit goods and copyright violations, as well as raising labor standards.
Vietnam has also sought to resolve the trade surplus problem by increasing the purchase of goods and services from the US, especially in the energy and aviation sectors.
At present, Professor Vuving assesses that Vietnam does not really have much room to reduce its trade surplus with the US without causing losses to the domestic economy.
"Vietnam has tried very hard to put pressure on state-owned and private companies to buy more US goods. But the ability to buy more US goods is not very great," he said to the BBC on September 19th.
In the long run, he believes that if Vietnam truly wants to reduce its trade surplus with the US, it must have strategic decisions.
"In this post-globalization era, as the world economy begins to separate in some ways, countries following supply chains into the US will be forced to make 'painful' choices. Either they prioritize the US market, forcing policy changes to align with the demands of the US market, unable to play both sides and become a bridge between both sides," he assessed.
In Vietnam's case, he believes that if Hanoi continues to act as a bridge, it will "naturally only increase the trade deficit with China and the trade surplus with the US. It is the same as the principle of equal exchange," he compared.
Mr. To Lam's Approach Compared to Predecessors
Since taking office as General Secretary in 2024, Mr. To Lam has made many overseas trips, received the visit of some foreign leaders, and upgraded the comprehensive strategic partnership with many partners, most recently the European Union.
Expanding this network is not only to increase diplomatic leeway but also to serve a clearer economic goal: attracting high-quality investment, accessing technology, expanding markets, and deepening the involvement of Vietnamese businesses in global supply chains.
When he officially unified the two positions of President and General Secretary, overseas trips still maintained a high frequency.
Professor Vuving believes that the notable point in Mr. To Lam's visits is science - technology and high-tech industries, which are often placed alongside traditional cooperation areas such as trade, investment, or defense.
"Mr. To Lam emphasized international integration, also emphasizing economic growth based on human capital, science, and technology. This is a very clear difference in Mr. To Lam compared to his predecessors," he assessed.
Facts Only
* Mr. To Lam will attend the high-level discussion session of the 81st United Nations General Assembly from September 20-25.
* During his stay in the US, Mr. To Lam will deliver a speech at the UN General Assembly and have bilateral meetings with leaders of several countries and international organizations.
* Mr. To Lam's schedule did not include any meetings with US President Donald Trump during this visit.
* The US has not yet determined Mr. Trump's itinerary during the Vietnamese leader's visit to the US, as stated by a White House official on September 15th.
* Previous visits included September 2024 for the UN General Assembly and February 2026 for the Gaza Peace Council session.
* No information suggests that Mr. Trump will meet Mr. To Lam during this third visit.
* Mr. To Lam and Mr. Trump exchanged telephone invitations to visit each other.
* The US initiated three major trade investigations against Vietnam between March and May 2026 concerning excess production capacity, forced labor, and intellectual property violations.
* Vietnam has sought to resolve the trade surplus issue by increasing purchases of goods and services from the US, especially in energy and aviation.
Executive Summary
General Secretary and President To Lam is scheduled to visit the US from September 20-25 for UN General Assembly discussions, bilateral activities, and a state visit to Canada. During this trip, Mr. To Lam will deliver a speech at the UN session and engage in bilateral meetings with leaders of various countries and organizations. There is no information regarding meetings with US President Donald Trump during this visit. This is the third time Mr. To Lam has visited the US since becoming General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam in August 2024. Previous visits included September 2024 for the UN General Assembly and February 2026 for the Gaza Peace Council session, where a meeting with Mr. Trump occurred but was not an official visit.
The lack of an official state visit stems from several factors. While invitations were exchanged between Mr. To Lam and Mr. Trump via telephone, no official or state visit has taken place despite preparations for trade agreements. The US Department of Defense noted that the US may not have arranged time for a visit. Further context suggests that unresolved bilateral issues, particularly concerning trade, are a significant obstacle. Trade negotiations have involved disputes over tariffs, leading to various policy shifts, but no specific agreement has been reached. Additionally, Vietnam is preparing to host APEC High-Level Week 2027 in Phu Quoc, which may offer alternative opportunities for interaction with US leaders.
Full Take
The repeated pattern of diplomatic engagement juxtaposed against unresolved economic tensions reveals a strategic friction point. The absence of an official visit suggests that formal state-level interaction is contingent upon substantive negotiation outcomes, rather than merely procedural scheduling. This dynamic highlights how trade imbalances—specifically Vietnam’s large trade surplus with the US—act as a governing constraint on high-level personal engagement. The history of tariff negotiations and subsequent policy shifts demonstrates that economic grievances precede and complicate diplomatic alignment.
Furthermore, Mr. To Lam's focus on integrating science, technology, and human capital into his outward network, compared to predecessors focused on traditional areas, signals a shift in strategic priorities. This evolution suggests an attempt to redefine the relationship beyond transactional trade toward deeper structural alignment. The looming APEC event presents a potential pivot point: if US leaders attend, it might substitute for a formal visit, suggesting that economic leverage and multilateral forums can serve as proxies for high-level engagement when direct bilateral pathways are blocked by existing systemic imbalances.
The core implication is the tension between strategic ambition (expanding global partnerships) and immediate material reality (the trade deficit). The repeated cycle of negotiation and non-agreement underscores a structural reality where economic pressures dictate diplomatic pace, forcing leaders to choose whether to pursue transactional goals or risk creating further divergence in the relationship with major economic powers. What forces remain unaddressed in the pursuit of these agreements, and how do structural dependencies shape sovereign decision-making when immediate economic pain is present?
